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NOTES
Motions for Appointment of Counsel and the Collateral Order
Doctrine
INTRODUCTION

Before the Supreme Court's decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord, 1 it seemed clear that orders denying appointment of
counsel in title VIP and in forma pauperis3 cases were immediately
appealable as a matter of right. 4 The courts of appeals that had considered these issues had held the orders immediately appealable under
the finality rule set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 5 and refined by the judicially created collateral order doctrine. 6 The consensus of the circuits and the absence of any substantial analysis of the issue7 may have
1. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
2. Title VII provides for appointment of counsel in employment discrimination cases:
"Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the
court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of
the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982).
3. Federal law permits the commencement of actions in forma pauperis, which in certain
cases relieves an indigent claimant from having to pay costs and fees and allows the appointment
of public counsel: ''The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to
employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that
the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982).
4. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Ray v.
Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 476-77 (3d Cir. 1981). But see Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26
(3d Cir. 1984) (finding that the circuit's earlier holding in Ray had been "effectively overruled"
by the Supreme Court's decision in Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984)).
According to Bradshaw, all courts of appeals addressing the appealability of orders denying
appointment of counsel in title VII cases before Firestone had "held such orders appealable,
finding them to fall squarely within the Cohen 'collateral order' exception to the final judgment
rule." 662 F.2d at 1305 (footnote omitted); see also Jones v. WFYR Radio, 626 F.2d 576, 578
(7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), overturned, Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064
(7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Hudak v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir.
1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d
1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977); Spanos v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806, 807 (3d Cir. 1972)
(per curiam). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit, in Harris v. Walgreen's Distrib. Center, 456 F.2d 588
(6th Cir. 1972), "implicitly reached a similar result with respect to orders denying appointment
of counsel in Title VII suits, without discussing the issue." Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1305-06 n.11.
The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion regarding a motion for appointment of counsel
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964 (1962). According to Bradshaw, "[t]he Miller reasoning is equally
applicable to Title VII orders." 662 F.2d at 1305 n.11.
5. "The courts of appeals • • . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States . • . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (emphasis added). There are, however, several statutory and
judicial exceptions to the finality rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982); note 38 infra.
6. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
'
7. The courts generally took the appeal after only a minimal analysis of the appealability
issue. The resulting per curiam opinions often did little more than cite Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.

1547

1548

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 83:1547

fostered a belief that the courts had settled the question of appealability of orders denying appointment of counsel. 8
In Firestone, the Supreme Court held that a pretrial order denying
a motion to disqualify opposing counsel is not appealable before final
judgment.9 As a result, the appeals courts began to reconsider their
positions on the appealability of orders denying appointment of counsel. The Ninth and Third Circuits reaffirmed their original positions
upholding immediate appeal. 10 The Seventh Circuit overturned an
earlier decision 11 and held that orders denying motions to appoint
counsel are not immediately appealable. 12 The First and Tenth Circuits, facing the issue for the first time, also refused to hear an immediate appeal. 13 Again, with one exception, the courts reached their
results in a conclusory fashion. 14
Two recent cases have answered questions concerning the appealability of orders granting motions to disqualify counsel that the Court
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See Jones v. WFYR Radio, 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam), overturned, Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); Hudak v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); Spanos v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1972) (per
curiam); Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 964
(1962).
8. In Jones v. WFYR Radio, 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), overturned, Randle
v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), the last decision on
the issue before Firestone, the court dealt with the appealability question in a conclusory footnote. 626 F.2d at n.* ("An order denying appointment of counsel is appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.") (citation omitted). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit reached the merits of an appeal from
the denial of a request for appointed counsel without even mentioning the propriety of such an
appeal. Harris v. Walgreen's Distrib. Center, 456 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1972). As the Ninth Circuit
noted in Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1981), "[l]ew of the cases
deciding the question of appealability of a refusal to appoint counsel have considered the issue
sufficiently difficult to merit prolonged discussion; most take their lead from the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1977)." (footnote omitted).
Caston itself contains little analysis to support the result it reaches. See note 24 infra.
9. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
10. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981); Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d
474 (3d Cir. 1981). In a later decision, the Third Circuit stated that the Supreme Court's decision in Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984), "effectively overruled" Ray. SmithBey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984).
11. Jones v. WFYR Radio, 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), overturned, Randle v.
Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
12. Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
13. Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Cotner v. Mason, 657
F.2d 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
14. The exception is Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981). Dissenting in Bradshaw, Judge Wallace stated: "The opinions cited by the majority ••• contain so little
analysis that they can hardly be considered persuasive. Some rely exclusively on Caston • • .
which •.• contains only one paragraph of analysis." 662 F.2d at 1320 n. l. (Wallace, J., dissenting). Judge Wallace conceded, however, that "the majority more than makes up for this paucity
of reasoning." 662 F.2d at 1320 n.l. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit devoted over fifteen pages to
arguments supporting its conclusion that orders denying appointment of counsel are immediately
appealable. 662 F.2d at 1303-18.
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had left open in Firestone. 15 In Flanagan v. United States, 16 the Court
ruled that such an order, in a criminal case, was not a final order immediately appealable under the collateral order exception. Since
Flanagan was decided, the courts of appeals have again split on the
question of whether orders denying appointment of counsel are immediately appealable. The Third Circuit found that Flanagan effectively
overturned its post-Firestone decision that such orders are immediately appealable. 17 The Sixth Circuit originally distinguished Flanagan and held that orders refusing appointment of counsel could be
immediately appealed; however, it recently vacated that decision in
accord with Flanagan. 18 The Eighth Circuit reached the same result
that the Sixth originally did, but did not discuss Flanagan. 19
In the 1985 case of Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller 20 the Court
expanded the holding of Flanagan to include orders disqualifying
counsel in civil cases. 21 It is not clear whether Koller will have an
impact upon the circuit courts' analysis of cases involving trial court
orders denying appointment of counsel.
This Note argues that denials of motions for appointment of counsel should be immediately appealable under the collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.22 Part I examines the extent to which the
15. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981), "[t]he Court reserved
the questions of the immediate appealability of pretrial denials of disqualification motions in
criminal cases and of pretrial grants of disqualification motions in both criminal and civil cases."
Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1052 (1984); see Firestone, 449 U.S. at 372 n.8.
Flanagan settled this question in the context of criminal cases; Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v.
Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985) did the same in the civil area.
16. 104 s. Ct. 1051 (1984).
17. Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that Flanagan effectively overturned Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981)).
18. Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dept., 739 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1984), vacated, 763
F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1985).
19. Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1984).
20. 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985).
21. Koller contains quite broad language. In expressly taking its holding outside the particular facts of the case, the Court stated that "orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases, as a class,
are not sufficiently separable from the merits to qualify for interlocutory appeal." 105 S. Ct. at
2766. Orders disqualifying counsel are distinguishable from the orders discussed in this Note
(trial court orders refusing to appoint counsel). See notes 116-32 infra and accompanying text.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). Although there are other means of appealing before final judgment, see notes 38-39 infra and accompanying text, this Note focuses on the collateral order
doctrine because it provides the best and perhaps the only means of obtaining immediate review
of an order denying appointment of counsel. Clearly, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982) and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) do not apply to this type of order. See note 38 infra. Further,
mandamus is a disfavored form of review, while the rule of Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.)
201 (1848) is very rarely invoked. See note 30 infra. If the collateral order doctrine applies, on
the other hand, review is available as a matter of right. See notes 38-39 infra. Moreover, certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982) is discretionary with the district court. It is not clear
that this type of order meets the requirements for immediate review set out in§ 1292(b). Section
1292(b) is chiefly concerned with judicial efficiency, whereas review of orders denying appointment of counsel is necessary because of the risk of irreparable harm to the pro se litigant. While
irreparable harm is central to the collateral order analysis, it appears to be irrelevant to certifica-
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collateral order doctrine modifies the finality rule. It argues that recent Supreme Court decisions that at first appear to have narrowed the
doctrine have in fact only restated it. Part II applies the collateral
order doctrine to orders denying appointment of counsel, concluding
that such denials qualify for immediate review. Part III argues that
policy considerations support this conclusion.

I.

THE FINALITY RULE AND THE COLLATERAL ORDER
DOCTRINE: COHEN TO KOLLER

In the federal courts, only a final judgment is appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.23 The Supreme Court has defined a final judgment as
"one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment." 24 Moreover, section 1291 forbids appeals "even from fully consummated decisions, where they are
but steps towards final judgments in which they will merge." 25 The
final judgment rule implements the policy against permitting "piecemeal appeals" 26 that might undermine the authority of district court
judges. 27
Nevertheless, the courts and Congress have for some time recognized that strict and technical insistence on finality would be, at times,
both inefficient and unjust. 28 Congress has acknowledged this point by
tion under§ 1292(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). The courts that have considered the appealability of orders denying appointment of counsel have focused exclusively on the collateral
order doctrine.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962) ("[T]he
final judgment rule is the dominant rule in federal appellate practice.") (quoting 6 J. MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 113 (2d ed. 1953)); note 5 supra.
24. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (citing St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.R. Co. v.
Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28 (1883)). This language is repeated in Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981) and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.
463,467 (1978). Stated another way, the effect of the finality rule "is to disallow appeal from any
decision which is tentative, informal or incomplete." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The Cohen Court added that "[a]ppeal gives the upper court a power of
review, not one of intervention. So long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive,
there may be no intrusion by appeal." 337 U.S. at 546.
25. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
26. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) (The final judgment rule "prevents .•• piecemeal
appellate disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single controversy."); Cobbledick
v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) ("[B]y forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of
what for practical purposes is a single controversy, [Congress] set itself against enfeebling judicial
administration.").
27. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) ("Permitting piecemeal
appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that
individual plays in our judicial system.").
28. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1981), ("[A) rigid
insistence on technical finality would sometimes conflict with the purposes of the statute.")
(quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978)); see also Note, The Finality
Rule for Supreme Court Review of State Court Orders, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1008 (1978)
(Rigid adherence to the finality rule may lead to "inefficient results."); Note, Proposals for Interlocutory Appeals, 58 YALE L.J. 1186, 1187 (1949) ("In many instances, however, the final judg-
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creating statutory exceptions to finality; 29 the courts have developed
the collateral order doctrine. 30 That doctrine, embodied in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 31 and its progeny, reflects a concern
on the part of the courts that the finality requirement be pragmatically
construed so as to avoid potentially irreparable injuries to the
litigant. 32
An individual seeking immediate appeal of an order declining to
appoint counsel must invoke the collateral order doctrine. Neither
mandamus nor interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)33 are
helpful alternatives. Mandamus has long been considered an extraordinary avenue to appellate review; this perception, in part, has led
to the adoption of alternative means of review like section 1292(b). 34
Section 1292(b) is also an inadequate alternative since it allows interlocutory appeals to be certified only on controversial questions of law
ment rule may be a wasteful formality; and under certain circumstances it can gravely jeopardize
the rights of litigants.") (footnote omitted).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982) provides for immediate review of orders dealing with injunctions, appointment of receivers, and admiralty cases. Section 1292(b) provides for interlocutory
appeals if (1) the trial judge certifies that an order "involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal . . .
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation" and (2) if the appellate court
decides to accept such an appeal. FED. R. C1v. P. 54(b) provides for interlocutory appeal under
certain circumstances in multiple party or multiple claim litigation. Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1982) provides for writs of mandamus, which may substitute for interlocutory appeal in extreme
situations.
30. The collateral order doctrine is by far the most common judicial exception to finality.
Several circuits formerly allowed another exception in cases where the order would effectively
terminate the case by making it impossible for the plaintiff to continue. This approach, which
came to be known as the "death knell" doctrine, was rejected by the Supreme Court in Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
Co0PER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3912 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 15 FEDERAL
PRACTICE]. In addition, the so-called Forgay doctrine provides a very limited exception to finality where hardship may result from orders that cannot be reviewed before final judgment are
entered before complete disposition of a case. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE supra, at
§ 3910. This doctrine originated in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
31. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Cohen was a shareholder's derivative suit in which the trial court
declined to require the plaintiff to post security for costs despite a state law that so required. The
defendant appealed the ruling before final judgment and the appellate court reversed. The
Supreme Court took this occasion to announce the collateral order doctrine and upheld the defendant's right to immediate appeal. While the collateral order doctrine is often thought to have
originated in Cohen, the Supreme Court has noted that Cohen only reformulated an older rule.
See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981) ("Cohen did not establish
new law; rather, it continued a tradition of giving § 1291 a 'practical rather than technical construction.' ") (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546); see also Note, Appellate Procedure: Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord: Tightening the Collateral Order Doctrine, 50 UMKC L. REv. 99,
102 n.28 (1981) (agreeing that "only the formulation" of the doctrine was new).
32. According to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976), the collateral order
doctrine reflects "the core principle that statutorily created finality requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable
injuries to be suffered." See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374
(1981).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). See note 29 supra.
34. See Note, Appea/ability in the Federal Courts, 15 HARV. L. REv. 351, 378 (1961).
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on which a substantial basis for a difference of opinion exists and from
which an appeal might expedite the litigation. 35
A.

The Collateral Order Doctrine as Articulated in Cohen

The collateral order doctrine formulated by Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 36 permits an appeals court to treat "a 'small class'
of orders that d[o] not end the main litigation [as] final and appealable
pursuant to § 1291."37 It has repeatedly been described as a narrow
exception to the finality requirement for appellate review set forth in
28 u.s.c. § 1291.38
The Supreme Court in Cohen set forth a test to determine which
orders fall within the small class that can be treated as final. Pursuant
to the Cohen standard, an order is immediately appealable if it "finally
determine[s] claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 39
Since Cohen, the Supreme Court's determinations of finality under
this test have not always been consistent.40 The Court itself has recognized that "[n]o verbal formula yet devised can explain prior finality
decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an utterly reliable guide
for the future." 41 This is partly because finality frequently involves
35. 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 499 (footnote omitted):
Again, however, [§ 1292(b)] does not provide strong reason for generally restricting the
collateral order doctrine. Its application depends on a certificate of the district court that an
order involves a controlling question of law . . . . The questions of law posed by truly
collateral orders are not apt either to be 'controlling' in relation to the rest of the litigation,
nor to be important to advancing ultimate termination.
See generally Comment, The Appealabi/ity of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of
Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 470-71 (1978).
36. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
37. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).
38. E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) ("Our decisions
have recognized, however, a narrow exception to the requirement that all appeals under§ 1291
await final judgment on the merits."); Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("We recognize that the Cohen doctrine is to be regarded as an exception to the final
judgment rule . . . ."); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("A
narrow exception to the final judgment rule is the 'collateral order' doctrine of Cohen ••• ,").
39. 337 U.S. at 546.
40. Compare Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 153 (1964) ("We cannot
say that the Court of Appeals chose wrongly [in allowing an immediate appeal] under the circumstances. And it seems clear now that the case is before us that the eventual costs • • . will
certainly be less ifwe now pass on the questions presented ...•"), ll'ith Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981) ("To be appcalable as a final collateral order, the
challenged order must constitute 'a complete, formal and, in the trial court, final rejection' • • •
of a claimed right 'where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever.'" (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) and United States v. Ryan,
402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971)).
41. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) (footnote omitted).
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close factual questions. 42 Nevertheless, the Court has consistently articulated the Cohen test in evaluating requests for immediate review. 43
B.

Collateral Order Cases Since Cohen and Their Effect on the
Original Rule

Four recent decisions regarding the collateral order doctrine Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 44 Firestone, 45 Flanagan, 46 and Koller 47
- suggest that the Supreme Court has begun to retreat from the notion that finality should be given a "practical rather than a technical
construction."48 In all four cases, the Supreme Court reversed lower
court decisions allowing immediate appeal. 49
42. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 n.9 (1974), the Court noted:
As Mr. Justice Black commented in Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964),
"Whether a ruling is 'final' within the meaning of § 1291 is frequently so close a question

that decision of that issue either way can be supported with equally forceful arguments, and
.•. it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming within what
might well be called the 'twilight zone' of finality."
See also Comment, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TExAs L. REv. 292, 295-96 (1966).
43. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); Gillespie v. United
States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951). Since 1949, the
Supreme Court has allowed immediate appeals from orders denying motions to dismiss based on
the double jeopardy clause, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); to proceed in forma
pauperis, Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (per curiam); to reduce bail,
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); and from an order granting a motion to allocate to the defendant the costs of notice in a class action, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
Conversely, the Supreme Court, pursuant to this test, has refused to allow immediate appeals
from orders refusing to certify class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Coopers &
Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 463; to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial, United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978); to suppress evidence, DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962);
to limit discovery, see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981); to quash
a subpoena, United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971); and to disqualify counsel, Firestone, 449
U.S. at 368; Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller,
105 s. Ct. 2757 (1985).
44. 437 U.S. 463 (1978). In Coopers & Lybrand, the Supreme Court refused to find an order
denying class certification immediately appealable despite the lower court's conclusion that such
an order made it impractical for plaintiff to continue the case.
45. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
46. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
47. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985).
48. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 375 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
546 (1949)).
49. At the time Firestone was decided, six circuits refused to permit immediate appeal from
orders refusing to disqualify opposing counsel while five permitted such appeals. Firestone, 449
U.S. at 373 n.10 (1981). Before 1979, the circuits had been split eight-to-three in favor of allowing appeal; but between 1979 and 1980, the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits overruled
previous holdings that had allowed immediate appeal. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 373 n.10.
Before Flanagan, seven circuits had allowed immediate appeals of orders disqualifying criminal defense counsel, while the Ninth Circuit had refused to do so. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 1053
n.2. Similarly, at the time the Court decided Koller, two circuits refused to assert jurisdiction
over immediate appeals of orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases, while four circuits did agree
to hear such interlocutory appeals. Koller, 105 S. Ct. at 2762.
When the Supreme Court decided Coopers & Lybrand, it reversed the Eighth Circuit's holding that denials of motion for class certification were immediately appealable. At the time of that
decision, at least three circuits allowed appeals from orders denying class certification, while two
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But while the Supreme Court may be attempting to control the
loose application of the collateral order doctrine, so nothing in these
four cases indicates that the Court has either changed its fundamental
test for immediately appealable collateral orders or narrowed the basic
principle set forth in Cohen. Indeed, despite its recent decisions denying the right to immediate appeal in certain contexts, the Supreme
Court has continued to apply the collateral order doctrine in other
situations. 51 In fact, Coopers & Lybrand, Firestone, Flanagan, and
Koller reinforce the Cohen collateral order doctrine rather than undercut it.
In Coopers & Lybrand, although the Court reformulated the Cohen
test slightly, it did not alter the substance of the test. The Coopers &
Lybrand Court held that to be appealable under the collateral order
doctrine, an "order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of
the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."52 This three-prong standard53 requires, as does the Cohen test,
a conclusive order collateral to the merits of the action itself. It differs
denied such appeals. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 465 n.2. The Coopers & Lybrand holding
also apparently overturned the death knell doctrine, which several circuits had used to allow
immediate appeals. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 476 ("[T]he 'death knell' doctrine does not
support appellate jurisdiction of prejudgment orders denying class certification.")
50. See Note, Civil Procedure-Interlocutory Appeals: Orders Denying Disqualification of
Counsel Are Not Appealable Pursuant to the Collateral Order Exception, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1035,
1040 (1982) ("[A]lthough the Supreme Court has stressed that the collateral order doctrine is a
yery narrow exception to the final judgment rule, the circuit courts have applied Cohen liberally
to assert jurisdiction over a wide variety of interlocutory orders.") (footnote omitted); Note,
supra note 31, at 107 (arguing that despite an apparent trend in the circuits to tighten the collat•
era! order doctrine with respect to orders denying disqualification, the Supreme Court decided
Firestone in an effort to accelerate the trend).
51. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I (1983) (upholding the finality of an order staying an action to compel arbitration under § 4 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982)); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (upholding the
finality of an order denying a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (upholding finality of an administrative ruling despite respondent's
failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)
(upholding the finality of an order that granted class action status and imposed the costs of giving
notice on the defendant).
52. 437 U.S. at 468 (footnote omitted) (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658
(1977) and United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855 (1978)).
53. There is some confusion as to whether the collateral order test has three parts or four.
Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper see four separate requirements: (1) a conclusive order, (2)
collateral to the merits, (3) that is effectively unreviewable after final judgment, and (4) that
affects a substantial right. 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 470-71 (1976),
However, it is not at all clear that the fourth part survives as an explicit additional requirement.
One commentator has said, "Some courts have continued to require 'public importance,' even
though the [Supreme] Court has not emphasized it in recent cases." Comment, supra note 35, at
455-56 (footnotes omitted); see also Significant Development, The Collateral Order Doctrine After
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord: The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel, 62 B.U. L. REv. 845, 862-63 (1982) (interpreting "important issue" as a
separate factor of the Cohen test but defining it as "the effect of the order on the particular
litigant") (footnote omitted). In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983), however, the Supreme Court relied on the Coopers & Lybrand formulation of the
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from the Cohen standard only in its specification that effective unreviewability on appeal from final judgment is a requirement for immediate review. This specification really only clarifies the Cohen
requirement that an order be "too important to be denied review." 54
In fact, in Cohen as well as in subsequent cases the Supreme Court has
insisted upon a permanent loss of a substantial right as a prerequisite
to interlocutory review. 55
Besides reformulating the Cohen test, the Court in Coopers &
Lybrand also discarded the "death knell" doctrine as a basis for determining finality. This development does not, however, narrow the
traditional Cohen rule. The death knell doctrine was developed by
several courts of appeals as a means of permitting immediate review,
independent of the Cohen exception, when an order would have the
practical effect of terminating a case. 56 A rejection of the death knell
collateral order doctrine. There, the Court viewed the doctrine as a three-part test and ignored
the "important issue" language in Coopers & Lybrand. 460 U.S. at 11-12 & n.13.
Actually it appears that Coopers & Lybrand may have quietly incorporated the fourth requirement into the second - the requirement that the order "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468; see also
Cone, 460 U.S. at 12 (finding the second requirement satisfied because "[a]n order that amounts
to a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important issue separate from the merits") (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, the Court devoted little or no attention to the "substantial
right" issue.
Even if the "important issue"/"substantial right" requirement survives, it is quite clearly
met in the case of an order denying appointment of counsel. The right to appointed counsel is
frequently so substantial that it is, as a practical matter, dispositive of the action. See Part III

infra.
54. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); see also Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 n.10 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658-59
(1977) (characterizing Cohen's third prong as requiring that the decision involved "an important
right which would be 'lost, probably irreparably,' if review had to await final judgment"). For an
explanation of the requirement that the right involved be important, see note 53 supra.
55. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); see also Abney
v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977). Cohen is a clear example of a case in which review
must be interlocutory if an issue is to be reviewed at all. The movant sought to assert his right
not to post bond. If the action had proceeded to final judgment without appeal, the issue would
have become moot. The Court observed that "[w]hen that time comes, it will be too late effectively to review the present order, and the rights conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will
have been lost, probably irreparably." 337 U.S. at 546; see also note 43 supra and cases cited
therein.
56. According to the death knell doctrine, an order is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1982) if it is likely to sound the death knell of the litigation. Pursuant to this doctrine, several
courts used language indicating that orders denying class certification would be immediately
reviewable. See, e.g., Hartman v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973) (suggesting that if the
order had operated as the death knell of the action, it would have been appealable); IS FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3912. The Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I (1983) described the death knell doctrine as follows:
The "death knell" doctrine rested on the argument that in some situations an interlocutory
decision (such as a refusal to certify a class) might terminate a suit as a practical matter
because the named plaintiff would lack an economic incentive to pursue his individual claim.
In a "death knell" case, however, the order sought to be appealed had no legal effect on the
named plaintiff's ability to proceed with his individual claim in federal court. There is an
obvious difference between a case in which the plaintiff himself may choose not to proceed,
and a case in which the district court refuses to allow the plaintiff to litigate his claim in
federal court.
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concept preserves the collateral order doctrine as the primary judicially created exception to finality. While Coopers & Lybrand may reflect a concern over the emergence of multiple judicial exceptions to
finality, it does not suggest a dissatisfaction with Cohen.
Implicit in Coopers & Lybrand 's rejection of the death knell doctrine is a finding that a litigant is not entitled to immediate review
under Cohen simply because a court anticipates that a certain order
may cause the litigant to abandon her action. This is particularly true
when the determination of whether a claim will be abandoned is unreliable,57 arbitrary, 58 susceptible to manipulation, 59 or inefficient. 60
However, this finding does not restrict Cohen since Cohen never held
that the possibility of unreviewability, by itself, justified an interlocutory appeal. 61 Rather, the collateral order doctrine has always required unreviewability coupled with a final order collateral to the
main action.
In addition, the Court in Coopers & Lybrand seems to have tightened the requirements for finding unreviewability by concluding that
an order denying class status is not effectively unreviewable after final
judgment despite the fact that it may be the death knell of the action.
However, the Court also held, without discussion, that such an order
is neither conclusive nor separate from the merits of the plaintiff's
cause of action. 62 In view of the Court's conclusion that the effect of
460 U.S. at 11 n.11 (emphasis in original).
57. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1978), the Court stated: "What
effect the economic disincentives created by an interlocutory order may have on the fate of any
litigation will depend on a variety of factors. Under the 'death knell' doctrine, nppealability turns
on the court's perception of that impact in the individual case."
58. In Coopers & Lybrand, the Court found the death knell rule administratively difficult
because "[s]ome courts have determined their jurisdiction by simply comparing the class of the
named plaintiffs with an arbitrarily selected jurisdictional amount." The Court added: "With•
out a legislative prescription, an amount-in-controversy rule is necessarily an arbitrary measure
of finality . • . ." 437 U.S. at 471-72 (footnote omitted).
59. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 472-73 (1978) ("Moreover, ifthejurisdic•
tional amount is to be measured by the aggregated claims of the named plaintiffs, appellate juris•
diction may tum on the joinder decisions of counsel rather than the finality of the order.")
(citation omitted).
60. Referring to one method of administering the death knell doctrine, the Court said, "The
potential waste of judicial resources is plain." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,473
(1978).
61. "[T)he inarticulate premise that Cohen embraces every order that cannot be later re•
viewed on appeal is a false one." D'Ippolito v. American Oil Co., 401 F.2d 764, 765 (2d Cir.
1968) (per curiam).
62. 437 U.S. at 469. It is not clear from the Coopers & Lybrand opinion whether the Court
viewed any one of these findings as more important than any other since it stated them, one after
the other, with no discussion. One might argue that since the findings with regard to separability
and finality are less controversial, the Court meant to base its holding on them and that the
conclusoiy statement of the more controversial issue of effective reviewability was added as dictum. In a similar case, a court refused to allow immediate review of an order refusing class status
but based its holding on a lack of finality and separability only. In re Cessna Aircraft Distributorship Antitrust Litig., 518 F.2d 213 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975).
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an order refusing to certify a class is uncertain, its holding with respect
to reviewability may only reflect a hesitancy to permit courts of appeals to speculate as to whether a given order is, as a practical matter,
reviewable. 63
Similarly, in Firestone, an order denying defendants' motion to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel in a civil case was held not to fall within the
collateral order exception because such an order could be effectively
reviewed on an appeal from a final judgment. 64 The Court in Firestone
did not tighten the "effectively unreviewable" test, but decided only
that the "petitioner fail[ed] to supply a single concrete example" of
irreparable harm that would result from deferred review. 65
The appellant's position in Firestone differed significantly from that
of the appellant in Cohen. In Cohen, if the lower court's decision that
the plaintiff was not required to post security for costs could not be
appealed pending final judgment, the appellant would have lost the
right it sought to assert - the right to have security posted before
permitting the plaintiff to proceed with the action. 66 Firestone, however, asserted a right only to avoid a prejudicial judgment that might
arise out of a trial conducted by a particular attomey. 67 That right
would not be lost by postponing review because Firestone could still
be given a new trial in which the asserted prejudice could be cured.
Thus, unlike the appellant in Cohen, Firestone did not face the possibility of losing the right asserted. Nevertheless, Firestone could have
obtained immediate review had it been able to establish the possibility
of losing "the legal and practical value" of the right asserted. 68 In the
63. Again, because of the conclusory nature of the Court's finding, it is hard to discern what
prompted the Court to state that an order refusing class status is reviewable only after final
judgment. However, in discussing the death knell doctrine, the Court stated that "litigation will
often survive an adverse class determination." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 470. The Court
continued, "What effect the economic disincentives created by an interlocutory order may have
on the fate of any litigation will depend on a variety of factors." 437 U.S. at 470 (footnote
omitted). Thus, the Court may have concluded simply that an order refusing to certify a class is
not clearly unreviewable upon final judgment.
64. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981).
65. 449 U.S. at 376.
66. Cf Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979) (right guaranteed by speech or debate
clause would be mooted if criminal defendants could be questioned about legislative activities at
trial); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (appellant's claim that he was about to be
subjected to double jeopardy would have been mooted if the second trial were allowed to proceed
to final judgment); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (order denying motion to reduce bail would
be moot if not reviewed before trial).
67. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 370-71 ("Petitioner argued that respondent had a clear conflict of
interest . . . [that] would give him an incentive to structure plaintiffs' claims for relief in such a
way as to enable the insurer to avoid any liability. This in tum, petitioner argued, could increase
its own potential liability.").
68. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 377 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860
(1978)). In referring to previous decisions upholding a right to immediate review, the Firestone
Court said that "each involved an asserted right the legal and practical value of which could be
destroyed ifit were not vindicated before trial." 449 U.S. at 377 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)).
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absence of such a finding, the Supreme Court refused to apply the collateral order doctrine. 69
Further, the Court's language in Firestone reflects no intent to
limit the Cohen collateral order doctrine. Although the Court did not
emphasize the tradition of giving section 1291 70 a practical rather than
a technical interpretation, it did briefly reiterate that policy by quoting
Cohen's statement on the matter. 71 In addition, the Court suggested
that instead of extending the collateral order doctrine beyond the limits set forth in Cohen, courts ought to rely more on the statutory exceptions to section 1291 to provide relief in appropriate cases.
However, the Court did not propose that these statutory measures replace the collateral order doctrine in cases where the Cohen test is
met. 72
In addition, although the Firestone Court stressed the narrowness
of the collateral order exception73 and the strictness of the effectively
unreviewable standard, 74 it reaffirmed its position that the irreparable
harm standard does not require that a right actually be lost if review is
denied. 75 The Court reiterated that an order is effectively unreviewable when it irreparably denies a right as a practical matter even
though it might not technically deny the right itself. 76 It was Firestone's failure even to show evidence of such a practical denial that
doomed its chances for immediate appeal. Firestone left open the
questions of the immediate appealability of pretrial grants of disqualification motions in both criminal and civil cases and of pretrial denials
of disqualification motions in criminal actions. 77 The Supreme Court
has since resolved two of these issues by holding that a trial court's
69. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 377. The Firestone Court did recognize, however, that there might
be situations in which a party would be irreparably damaged if forced to wait until a final adjudication before securing review of an order denying its motion to disqualify opposing counsel.
However, the Court decided that it was not necessary "to resolve those situations, [by creating] a
general rule permitting the appeal of all such orders." Instead, in those rare instances, "the
moving party may seek sanctions short of disqualification" or it may pursue statutory exceptions
to the finality rule. 449 U.S. at 378-79 n.13.
70. 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1982).
71. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 375 ("Cohen . .• continued a tradition of giving§ 1291 a 'practical
rather than a technical construction.'") (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
546 (1949)).
72. See Firestone, 449 U.S. at 378 & n.13.
73. 449 U.S. at 374.
74. 449 U.S. at 376 (noting that in order to satisfy the effectively unreviewable standard, it
must be the case that 'denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever.'") (quoting United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971)).
75. 449 U.S. at 376 ("It is true that the finality requirement should 'be construed so as not to
cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered.' ")
(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976)).
76. All previous collateral orders, the Court stated, have "involved an asserted right the legal
and practical value of which could be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.'' Firestone,
449 U.S. at 377 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)).
77. 449 U.S. at 372 n.8.
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pretrial decision to disqualify counsel in either a criminal (Flanagan v.
United States)78 or a civil (Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller)79 case is
not immediately appealable.
Although Flanagan and Koller follow the path blazed by Coopers
& Lybrand and Firestone, they do not undermine the validity of the
collateral order exception. The Court found in both80 cases that if the
right to be represented by counsel of one's choice were found to be
improperly denied and to warrant reversal even without a showing of
prejudice, the denial would not meet the third prong of the Coopers &
Lybrand's test - the requirement that the order be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."81 Alternatively, if the order could be reversed only upon a showing of prejudice, it would fail
to satisfy the second Coopers & Lybrand condition that the order be
truly collateral. 82 Despite the results reached in these cases, the Court
simply applied the Coopers & Lybrand test in reaching its decisions.
No narrowing or undermining of the traditional collateral order doctrine occurred.
Thus, although some courts of appeal have relied on Firestone and
Flanagan 83 as precedent for denying immediate review of orders refusing to appoint counsel, 84 the Cohen doctrine itself has not been fundamentally altered. Accordingly, if an order denying appointment of
counsel satisfies the Cohen test, it ought to be appealable as a collateral
order.
78. 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
79. 105 s. Ct. 2757 (1985).
80. These cases were decided on very similar grounds. While the Flanagan Court emphasized the particularly compelling need to avoid piecemeal criminal prosecutions due to the strong
interest both the public and the accused have in prompt resolution of criminal cases, 104 S. Ct. at
1054-55, any suggestions that the case's outcome turned upon its being a criminal rather than a
civil dispute were resolved by Koller, 105 S. Ct. at 2763 ("Although delay is anathema in criminal cases, it is also undesirable in civil disputes . . . .").
81. Koller, 105 S. Ct. at 2767 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468) (footnote omitted); Flanagan, 104 S. Ct. at 1056 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468) (footnote
omitted).
82. Koller, 105 S. Ct. at 2764; Flanagan, 104 S. Ct. at 1056-57.
83. The impact of Koller, decided June 17, 1985, is net yet known.
84. Firestone led three courts of appeals to conclude that orders denying motions to appoint
counsel were not immediately appealable. See Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145, 146 (1st Cir.
1983) (per curiam); Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1066 (7th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1392 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). The Third
Circuit later concluded, in Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984), that Flanagan
effectively overturned its earlier decision, Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981), which
had treated orders denying motions to appoint counsel as immediately appealable. The Sixth
Circuit also vacated one of its earlier decisions in accordance with Flanagan. Henry v. City of
Detroit Manpower Dept., 763 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1985) (vacating 739 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1984)).

1560

II.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 83:1547

THE COHEN TEST APPLIED TO DENIALS OF MOTIONS FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

To be immediately appealable as a collateral order, an order denying a motion to appoint counsel must satisfy the tripartite test85 set
forth in Cohen. 86 The Cohen test was formulated to advance the purposes of the final judgment rule, which are to avoid inefficiency and
injustice and to protect the independence of district court judges. 87 By
bringing the collateral order doctrine into play only when these goals
will be furthered, the Cohen test prevents courts from undermining the
finality rule. This section applies the three-part test to orders denying
appointment of counsel and concludes that each part of the test is
satisfied.
A.

Conclusive Ruling

The first requirement under the Cohen test is that the order be
conclusive. To satisfy this requirement the order cannot be "inherently tentative." 88 Thus, an order such as a denial of class certifica85. See notes 39 & 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
86. According to the Ninth Circuit, however, it is not altogether clear how courts should
apply the Cohen test:
While in this case we have examined each of the elements of the Cohen rule separately, and
have found that each is satisfied, we do not mean to suggest that this type of analysis is the
only proper method to be used in determining whether the collateral order exception applies
in cases involving other types of orders. The three Cohen criteria are in some instances
interrelated. In some cases one element may be of far greater significance to the outcome
than the others. We have noted earlier that two of the three elements are not absolute in
nature. The separability determination is at times a relative one - "too independent of the
cause itself." The reviewability determination - effectively unreviewable - may require a
similar kind of judgment. The same may in some instances be true with respect to the
finality requirement.
Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1314 n.35 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted). This reasoning suggests that courts will apply the Cohen test differently, depending on subjective _perceptions of the nature and relative importance of each prong of the test.
See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text; see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v.
Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757, 2760-61 (1985); Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1054 (1984);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). Cf. Note, The Finality and Appealability of Interlocutory Orders - A
Structural Reform Toward Redefinition, 1 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1037, 1045 (1973) ("In fact, the
threat of irreparable harm seems to be the overriding consideration that evokes this collateral
order doctrine to find appealability within section 1291.") (footnote omitted); Comment, supra
note 35, at 452 (''The final judgment rule can nevertheless lead to unjust results or inefficiencies
in certain circumstances. Statutory and judicial exceptions have therefore been created to mitigate its effects."); Comment, Collateral Orders and Extraordinary Writs as Exceptions to the Finality Rule, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 746, 757 (1957) ("Courts have recognized the frequent hardships
which would attend an inflexible application of the final decision rule and have permitted it to be
circumvented").
88. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 & n.11; Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 & n.14 (1983); see also 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 30, § 3911, at 470 ("First, the matter to be reviewed must have been finally disposed
of by the district court, so that its decision is not 'tentative, informal or incomplete.' " (quoting
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949))).
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tion, 89 which may be reconsidered by the district court, does not
qualify for immediate review. 90 However, the mere fact that a court
has the power to change its ruling does not mean that its order can
never be found to be conclusive. 91 On the contrary, Cohen was only
concerned with insuring that the order would not be "subject to reconsideration/ram time to time" by the trial court.92 In this sense, a ruling is "inherently tentative" only when "some revision [by the lower
court] might reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of litigation."93 Under this standard, an order denying appointment of counsel is final and therefore appealable.94
B. Separability

The circuit courts disagree on whether an order denying appointment of counsel embodies an issue sufficiently "separate from the
merits of the action" to invoke the collateral order doctrine. 95 The
Supreme Court's language suggests that the separability test is a rela89. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(l) "provides that an order involving class status
may be 'altered or amended before the decision on the merits.' " Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11 (1978).
90. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1306 n.14 (9th Cir. 1981).
91. 15 FEDERAL PRAcnCE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 470.
92. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949) (emphasis added).
93. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 13 n.14 (1983).
94. See, e.g., Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 588 (8th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw v.
Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1981) (conclusiveness requirement satisfied
where "the district court •.. in no way indicat[ed] that its order was tentative"); Spanos v.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806, 808 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (denial of motion to
appoint counsel found to be conclusive notwithstanding district court's expressed willingness to
reconsider motion at later point in action).
Cf. Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (acknowledging that
the order denying the motion for appointment of counsel "arguably satisfies the first two prongs
of the test"). But see Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dept., 763 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1985)
("Orders denying appointment should be presumed tentative, however, because these motions
are . . . frequently made with the filing of a pro se complaint and with little or no showing of any
efforts to obtain counsel."); Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
(order denying appointment of counsel not necessarily conclusive, but instead subject to revision
by the district court).
95. Several courts have suggested that a denial of a motion to appoint counsel is sufficiently
collateral to qualify for immediate review, reasoning that the refusal to appoint an attorney is
separable from the merits of the action. See Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 588
(8th Cir. 1984); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977); see also
Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981). But see Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22,
24, 26 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that the order denying counsel in Ray "clearly met the finality
and separability requirements," but concluding that Ray's holding was erroneous insofar as it
found the order effectively unreviewable).
However, Judge Wallace's dissent in Bradshaw maintains that "[t]o determine whether a
district judge's decision on the appointment of counsel constitutes an abuse of discretion, we
would have to become at least somewhat enmeshed in the merits." Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy.,
662 F.2d 1301, 1322 (9th Cir. 1981) (Wallace, J., dissenting); see also Smith-Bey, 741 F.2d at 24;
Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
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tive one. 96 In Cohen, the Court said the separability requirement is
satisfied when an order is "too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred." 97 Coopers & Lybrand
defined noncollateral issues as questions that are "enmeshed in the factual and legal issues" of or "intimately involved with the merits" of
the plaintiff's case. 98 The Supreme Court does not, therefore, demand
that a collateral order be wholly unrelated to the ·main action. 99
Under the Supreme Court's language, an order denying a motion
to appoint counsel qualifies as independent. In evaluating such a motion, a judge must look to the plaintiff's financial resources, her efforts
to secure counsel, and the legitimacy of her cause of action. 100 Undeniably, an examination of the legitimacy of the plaintiff's claim will
require some familiarity with the facts of that claim; however, it would
not "enmesh" the court in those facts. It would require only an "inci96. See note 86 supra.
97. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (emphasis added).
Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper suggest that the Cohen opinion itself sets forth two
aspects of separability - the question of whether an appeal can be handled without reference to
the merits of the main action and the question of whether the appealed ruling is something that
will merge in the final judgment. 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 480. However, they also imply that these twin requirements are not fully reflected in more recent cases "in
which the collateral nature of the order has been substantially ignored." Id. at n.32. They conclude that "[m]any cases satisfy both requirements. Other cases ignore one or both of these
requirements, ordinarily because a threat of significant injury has seemed by itself sufficient reason to allow immediate appeal." Id. at 480.
In fact, recent cases sometimes address only the question of whether the appeal can be handled without reference to the merits of the main action. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981) ("In addition, we will assume ••. that the disqualification
question 'resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action.' •• ,");
Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1307-10 (9th Cir. 1981). However, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated with regard to orders granting motions to
disqualify counsel in civil actions:
[T]he extensive record now before us presents an entirely adequate basis for determining
whether the district court's order was proper. That determination does not depend on subsequent events at trial, does not require us to "make any step toward final disposition of the
merits of the case and will not be merged in final judgment."
Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737- F.2d 1038, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (emphasis added), vacated, 105 S. Ct.
2757 (1985).
In any event, one commentator has stated that the separability standard is met when "[t]he
appealable ••• order ..•• is an action itself, a separate litigation." Underwood, Appeals in the
Federal Practice from Collateral Orders, 36 VA. L. REV. 731, 738 (1950).
98. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 & n.12 (1978) (quoting Mercantile
Natl. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963) and 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30,
§ 3911, at 485 n.45).
99. In Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit recognized the relative nature of the requirement. See note 86 supra. Professors Wright, Miller, and
Cooper have alluded to the same conclusion: "Despite these formal requirements, however, examination of the separate requirements shows that if a sufficiently impressive showing of potential injury can be be made, the requirement of separability can be tacitly ignored." 15 FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 478.
100. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981); Caston v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1977); Significant Development, supra note 53, at 846
n.9.
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dental" and "indirect" reference to the substance of the cause of action.101 In fact, resolution of such an appeal would require no more
familiarity with the main claim than resolution of an appeal from an
order denying permission to proceed in forma pauperis, which requires a similar finding as to the legitimacy of the cause of action. 102
The Supreme Court has already concluded that the denial of a motion
to proceed in forma pauperis is immediately appealable, thereby recognizing that such a superficial examination of a plaintiff's lawsuit is separable from the merits. 103
Immediate appeal of orders denying motions to appoint counsel
would simply not produce any of the harms that the separability requirement is intended to prevent. One such harm is unwarranted interference by appellate courts in the merits of the case - issues that
are properly reserved to the district courts until completion of the action.104 However, a judgment based on the pleadings regarding the
legitimacy of the action will not seriously interfere with the trial
court's much more thorough inquiry into the merits of the claim. 105 A
ruling by the appellate court regarding frivolousness would not control
the trial court's findings on the merits because the ruling would not be
directly tied to the merits. Nor would such a ruling create the possibility of repetitive consideration of the merits by the court of appeals
- another danger that the separability requirement is intended to prevent.106 The very brief reference to the facts needed for a determination regarding frivolousness would not duplicate the much closer
examination of the facts that would be necessary upon appeal from
final judgment.
101. Thus the order involves only incidental and usually indirect reference to the substance of the plaintiff's claim. It . . . does not, under any circumstances, require the court
to become "enmeshed" in the issues involved in a determination of the merits. . . •
Other orders that have been held appealable under the Cohen exception also require
some reference to the merits.
Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1981).
102. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1981) {"forma pauperis
status requires two findings very similar to those required in this case: (1) a finding of indigency,
and (2) a finding that the underlying claim has some merit.") (footnote omitted).
103. See Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (per curiam).
104. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1981).
105. In Luna v. International Assn. of Machinists Local 36, 614 F.2d 529, 531 (5th Cir.
1980), the court looked to the facts alleged by the plaintiff to guide its determination of whether
the cause had merit. In addition, in title VII cases, the courts often rely on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's issuance of a right-to-sue Jetter in determining whether a suit
has merit. See Luna, 614 F.2d at 531; Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1319-20
(9th Cir. 1981) (deferring to agency finding that there was "reasonable cause to believe that the
plaintiff was the victim of discrimination" and finding no further inquiry into the merits of the
claim necessary).
106. See 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 470-71.
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C. Availability of Effective Review After Trial
The third and perhaps most important107 prong of the collateral
order test has generated the most disagreement among the circuits in
cases involving appeals from orders denying appointment of counsel.
The appeals courts that have refused immediate review of such orders
have generally relied on this prong for their decisions. 108
There are several good reasons for concluding that orders denying
appointment of counsel are only effectively reviewable before entry of
a final judgement. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f)(l)
confer on certain litigants the right to appointed counsel. 109 If that
right is improperly denied, its "legal and practical value" may be permanently lost because the pro se litigant may make prejudicial errors
during the first trial which would render a new trial, with or without
the assistance of counsel, worthless. 110 Since the collateral order doctrine defines as effectively unreviewable decisions denying rights, "the
107. The decision whether to allow immediate review in a particular case, based on the collateral order doctrine, usually turns on this third prong. According to Professors Wright, Miller,
and Cooper, it is not difficult to find cases which have ignored some of the other requirements.
15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 468.
108. See Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1066 (7th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 191S(d) (1982) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(f)(l) (1982) appear to leave appointment of counsel up to the discretion of the judge. However, if a pro se litigant seeks such
counsel lllld meets the statutory criteria, presumably a judge must appoint counsel. If not, appeal
from a refusal to appoint counsel would be worthless since the district court's decision could not
be reversed. While the courts have not recognized a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases,
these statutes certainly reveal a congressional intent to confer on litigants who meet the relevant
criteria a statutory right to counsel. See generally Poindexter v. FBI, 737 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (a title VII case). Some commentators have called for a constitutional right to counsel in
civil cases. See Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 CoLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1966);
Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967); cf. Slavin v.
Curry, 690 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1982) (right to counsel exists in "exceedingly complex" cases
under § 191S(d)).
Some courts have suggested that the need for counsel is particularly acute in title VII
cases: [T]he nature of Title VII actions more often than not pits parties of unequal strength
and resources against each other. The complainant, who is usually a member of a disadvantaged class, is opposed by an employer who not infrequently is one of the nation's major
producers, and who has at his disposal a vast array of resources and legal talent.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 2137, 2148; see also Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1183. At least two courts have considered
Congress' special concern for title VII complainants in reasoning that an order denying appoint•
ment of counsel in an employment discrimination case will, because of the complexity of the
action, be effectively unreviewable. See Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dept., 739 F.2d
1109, 1117-18 (6th Cir. 1984), vacated, 763 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1985); Bradshaw v. Zoological
Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981).
This Note assumes that there is no distinction between title VII and other actions for purposes of considering whether an order denying counsel may be immediately appealed. See
Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e cannot discern any
sensible reason for basing the appealability determination on whether a civil rights plaintiff
brought a Title VII suit as opposed to a § 1983 suit.").
110. See, e.g., Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw
v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981); Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co.,
664 F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
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legal and practical value of which could be destroyed if. . not vindicated before trial," 111 orders denying appointment of counsel should
qualify as effectively unreviewable.
The Court's refusal to accept this argument in Firestone was not an
outright rejection of the point. Instead, the Court's decision reflected
a determination that the "petitioner fail[ed] to supply a single concrete
example of the indelible stamp or taint of which it wam[ed]." 112 The
petitioner's only assertion was that without immediate review, the respondent might shape his clients' claims for relief in a way that irreparably increased petitioner's liability. 113 The Court found that this
result would not constitute sufficient injury, 114 and that, in any case,
petitioner did not establish conclusively that it was likely to occur in
the absence of immediate appeal. 115
Similar considerations distinguish Flanagan and Koller. In both
cases, the unavailability of interlocutory appeal did not leave any party
without counsel at trial or on appeal. 116 In contrast, a litigant who
could not appeal an order denying a motion to appoint counsel would
be forced to proceed as her own attorney - a formidable undertaking
that might cause the plaintiff to give up altogether or to make blunders
that would render her claim untenable even if counsel were appointed
following a successful appeal from a final judgment.
Where a litigant is erroneously denied appointed counsel in a civil
case, the limitations inherent in pro se litigation would irreparably
jeopardize the right asserted in the absence of immediate review. 117
111. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981) (quoting United
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)). The Court in Firestone also stated tliat "the
finality requirement should 'be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost
and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered.'" Firestone, 449 U.S. at 376 (quoting Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976)).
112. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981). In Firestone, the
Court in fact admitted that there would be situations in which irreparable harm would result
from a denial of immediate review. However, it expected such cases to be rare and thus thought
alternative remedies could deal with them. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 378 n.13. Indeed, the availability of alternative remedies arguably distinguishes Firestone from a case in which a plaintiff's
motion to appoint counsel has been denied. A litigant whose motion to appoint counsel has been
denied has no alternative remedy. See Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064,
1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
113. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 376.
114. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 376 ("Our cases require much more before a ruling may be considered 'effectively unreviewable' absent immediate appeal.'') See also Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410
F.2d 843, 846 (3d Cir. 1969) (Pecuniary injury alone may not be sufficient to invoke review
because "[e]very interlocutory order involves, to some degree, a potential loss.'').
115. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 376. ("[P]etitioner has made no showing that its opportunity for
meaningful review will perish unless immediate appeal is permitted.'').
116. See Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dept., 739 F.2d 1109, 1116 (6th Cir. 1984),
vacated, 763 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1985).
117. See, e.g., Poindexter v. FBI, 737 F.2d 1173, 1180, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1984). "Courts have
long recognized the problems of the pro se litigant.'' Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664
F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J., dissenting). In addition, one commentator has
stated, "Proceeding pro se, even in the presence of the most protective trial judge, the average
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One study of federal pro se litigation has noted that "[t]he assistance
of counsel is the most important prerequisite to obtaining fair review
of federal claims . . . . There is simply no other way to assure [indigent] litigants substantial justice . . . ." 118 Another has noted that
"[t]he pro se litigants' record of success is so poor that they have been
characterized as a 'society of losers.' " 119
In addition, the courts, particularly in the criminal area, have repeatedly stressed that "[t]he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to
the very existence of a fair trial.'' 12° Finally, "[s]ubstantial differences
have been found in the outcomes of the cases in which the defendant is
unrepresented as compared with the cases in which he has counsel." 121
These observations are equally applicable in civil cases. The courts
recognize a constitutional right to counsel in criminal but not in civil
cases because the potential loss is typically greater in a criminal
trial, 122 not because a criminal trial presents more complex issues. 123
The difficulties confronting a pro se litigant threaten to injure irreparably both the legal. and practical value of her asserted right to
counsel unless an erroneous refusal to appoint counsel is immediately
reviewable. The legal value is threatened not because the issue becomes immediately moot as in Cohen, but because an untrained pro se
litigant may never make it to final judgment and subsequent appeal. A
pro se litigant is unlikely to have the capacity to develop and follow an
litigant may waive certain privileges, fail to assert some essential fact or issue, or even enter into
an unconscionable settlement for lack of knowledge of his full rights under the law." Note, The
Indigent's "Right" to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 1009 (1975),
Other courts have discussed the difficulties encountered by pro se prisoners. See Hudson v.
Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam), affd. on rehearing, 424 F.2d 854
(D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960); see generally Rob•
bins & Herman, Litigating Without Counsel: Faretta or For Worse, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 629
(1976); Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the
Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157 (1972); see also commentary cited at note 109 supra.
Some of the criminal right-to-counsel cases discuss generally the handicaps inherent in pro se
litigation. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-36 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). Moreover, as one commentator has noted, "many of the underlying
inequities suffered by the pro se litigant have remained hidden." Zeigler & Hermann, supra, at
160.
118. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117, at 211 (footnote omitted).
119. Flannery & Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More Than a Pawn in the
Game, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 769, 770 (1975) (quoting Kohn, 'Society of Losers' Finds a Winner; Widow Wins Second Circuit Case, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 23, 1971, at 1, col. 7).
120. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
121. AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 13 (1967),
122. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) ("When the
deprivation of property rights and interests is of sufficient consequence, denying the assistance of
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves is a denial of due process.")
(footnote omitted).
123. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7
(1964) ("Laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights when dealing with
practiced and carefully counseled adversaries.").
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effective litigation strategy. 124 As a result, she may become frustrated
and abandon the claim before final judgment, forfeiting the legal value
of the right to appointed counsel. 125 Similarly, a pro se litigant might
fail on a technicality to secure an appeal. 126
The practical value of the asserted right to appointed counsel is
threatened because, although the litigant may actually obtain the right
to appointed counsel following appeal, her errors in the first trial may
have rendered the right meaningless. The pro se litigant might settle
for an inadequate sum127 or prevail at trial but recover less than she
would have recovered with the assistance of counsel. 128 An even
more serious threat to the practical value of the right to appointed
counsel is posed by the fact that the pro se litigant will be bound in a
124. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1981). The typical prose
litigant has been characterized as "indigent, formally untutored in the law and often uneducated." Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117, at 159 (footnotes omitted). Nor can a prose litigant
rely on help from the judge to insure a fair trial. "Most pro se litigants . • • agree that a kindly
attitude on the part of the court is no substitute for an attorney." Robbins & Herman, supra note
117, at 678. "[T]he fact remains that limitations on the court's jurisdiction can preclude, at
times, assistance or forgiveness." Id. at 677.
125. See, e.g., Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw
v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981); Robbins & Herman, supra note 117, at
677 ("[S]ome litigants, perplexed by the proceedings . . • or failing to recognize that the district
court has erred, simply give up."); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117, at 212 ("Allowing complaint actions to remain open without assigning counsel is often very cruel, and results in distress,
distrust, disgust and hatred for legal institutions."). If the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the
case, no appeal would be available. See Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1052
(D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985).
While the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay apparently abandoned the death
knell doctrine as a basis for determining reviewability after final judgment, it is not entirely clear
whether the Court abolished the doctrine altogether or only concluded that the mere fact that a
litigant may abandon her claim is not, without more, sufficient to render an order effectively
unreviewable. 437 U.S. 463,477 (1978). Unlike Coopers & Lybrand, even if the plaintiff who is
erroneously denied counsel elects to pursue the claim, she is unlikely to be able to do so without
causing irreparable damage to her cause of action. The situation is thus more aptly characterized
as "death knell plus."
126. Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117,
at 219-20.
It is more difficult to secure an appeal after final judgment because under 28 U.S.C. § 2111
(1982) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, a pro se litigant must not only show that the
judge's order refusing counsel was erroneous, she must also show that it was prejudicial. This
will increase her ultimate burden of proof, Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1313-14, since, if she were
granted an immediate appeal, she would only need to show error.
In addition, commentators who conducted an extensive study of pro se litigation in the Second Circuit discovered that approximately 85% of all pro se appeals were terminated before or
shortly after an appeal was noticed. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117, at 219. This is partly
because of the complexity of the appeal procedures. Id. This study also revealed that in most of
those cases which did survive the procedural phase of the appeal, relief was summarily denied.
Id. at 242.
127. Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting) (''Thus, the pro se litigant . . • may feel pressured to compromise his substantive
rights by settling on terms less favorable than those he could have negotiated had he been
represented").
128. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1981).
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second trial by "the inevitable prejudicial errors" she may have made
at the first trial. 129 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, admissions
by a party opponent are admissible into evidence. 130 Thus, any statement a pro se litigant might make in her first trial, either in pleadings,
on the stand, or in depositions, could be introduced in the second trial.
Moreover, the litigant's mistakes in the first action could taint the second even if counsel prevented those mistakes from being repeated. As
the Supreme Court has observed with respect to criminal cases: "[A]
second trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prosecutor could
make use of evidence which came out at the first trial when the accused was uncounseled. If the second trial were held before the same
judge, he might no longer be open-minded." 131 Thus the absence of
an immediate appeal, assuming an erroneous ruling by the lower
court, effectively denies the plaintiff the value of her right to pursue
her claim with the assistance of counsel. 132

Ill.

THE POLICY SUPPORTING IMMEDIATE APPEAL FROM
DENIALS OF MOTIONS TO APPOINT COUNSEL

The courts created the collateral order doctrine to mitigate the
hardship caused by technical insistence 133 on the finality rule. 134
Thus, the collateral order doctrine reflects a balance struck between
the inefficiency of piecemeal litigation and the possible injustice of
delay. 135
129. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1981). According to
the court in Bradshaw, the litigant could "be bound by or impeached with her earlier testimony,
or suffer adverse consequences from uninformed and unwise stipulations." Bradshaw, 662 F.2d
at 1312; see also text at note 121 supra.
130. FED. R. Evrn. 801(d)(2).
131. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 2S, S4 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). See generally
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 759-97 (E. Cleary ed. 3d ed. 1984).
132. In Firestone, the Court relied on alternative remedies, such as protective orders limiting
counsel's ability to disclose confidential information, to take care of cases in which a denial of
immediate review actually would result in irreparable harm. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 n.13 (1981). There does not appear to be an equivalent alternative
remedy in cases in which a court has denied a motion to appoint counsel.
133. This Note has attempted to apply the Cohen test formally and to argue that all three
parts are separately met; however, courts and commentators have suggested that the test need
not be so strictly applied. See note 86 supra. "It would be difficult to quarrel with a tendentious
statement that the finality requirement should not be applied as a sterile formality, but should
instead be applied pragmatically with an eye to fulfilling its underlying purposes." 15 FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3913, at 522. If an order denying a motion to appoint counsel qualifies for review under the more formal application of the rule, it certainly ought to qualify under a
more pragmatic standard - especially where review furthers the purposes of the collateral order
doctrine.
134. See note 87 supra and accompanying text. "Absent a sharp change in the course of
events, the collateral order doctrine deserves to continue in substantially its present form, as a
means of protection against irreparable injury in some of the many situations that do not fall
within the narrow confines of the original hardship doctrine ofForgay v. Conrad." 15 FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at S00 (footnote omitted).
135. The determination of whether an order is immediately appealable "requires some evalu-
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Immediate review of orders denying motions to appoint counsel
will often promote efficiency. If the plaintiff is successful on interlocutory appeal, not only will a new trial be avoided, but the remainder of
the pending action will be conducted more efficiently. 136 Conversely,
if the litigant's interlocutory appeal is unsuccessful, the litigation may
come to an end. 137 The interests of judicial economy are therefore
"best served by permitting such appeals." 138
Regardless of judicial efficiency, 139 immediate appeal is justified to
prevent the hardship that delayed review would impose on any plaintiff denied appointed counsel. 140 The collateral order doctrine remains the principal means of avoiding the injustice that the finality
rule sometimes produces. 141 Delayed review of an order denying appointment of counsel could irreparably threaten the asserted right to
the assistance of counsel. 142 This right is particularly well-recognized
with respect to criminal defendants, 143 but also exists by congressional
mandate for certain civil litigants. 144 Congress' statutes reflect a longstanding policy against pro se litigation. 145 The strength of this policy
is clearly reflected in Faretta v. California, 146 a criminal case in which
ation of the competing considerations underlying all questions of finality - 'the inconvenience
and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the
other.'" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974) (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)) (footnote omitted).
136. Litigation conducted by attorneys is "more orderly, rational, and reasonable.'' Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1309 n.20 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Zeigler & Hermann,
supra note 117, at 202-05 (noting that pro se litigants tend to allow the litigation to stagnate at
various stages).
137. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A civil rights
litigant, untrained in the law, may well decide that he is incapable of handling the trial and drop
his claim . . . .''); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117, at 160 ("Most prose litigation never
reaches the trial stage . . . .'').
138. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981).
139. The collateral order doctrine does not restrict immediate review to those cases in which
application of the finality rule would be both inefficient and unjust. See Note, The Finality Rule
for Supreme Court Review of State Court Orders, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1004, 1010 (1978) (exceptions to finality "should be restricted either to circumstances so extraordinary and compelling
that they cannot justifiably be sacrificed for the common good or to situations in which insistence
on finality would be sheer formalism").
140. See Note, supra note 87, at 1045.
141. See Note, supra note 34, at 351 ("Any judicial system that affords a right to appellate
review must ensure that appeal does not come too late to be effective.''). This ensurance is the
purpose of the collateral order doctrine. See id. at 364; Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to
Appealability in the Federal Courts, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 89, 110 (1975).
142. See Part IL C supra.
143. See, e.g.• Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); cf Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806 (1975) (emphasizing that the right to counsel in a criminal proceeding is a "clear constitutional rule" but holding that a state may not prevent a defendant from representing himself).
144. See note 109 supra.
145. See generally commentary cited in note 109 supra.
146. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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the Supreme Court seriously considered denying a litigant the right
voluntarily to appear pro se in a state court proceeding.

Thus, a pro se litigant should have every opportunity to demonstrate that she has a right to have counsel appointed by the court.
Clearly, one of the justifications for this policy is the inability of most
prose litigants to represent their own interests adequately. Thus, even
if this policy does not quite compel a constitutional right to representation in civil cases, it at least justifies allowing pro se civil litigants the
opportunity to vindicate their statutory rights to counsel before those
rights are rendered meaningless.
CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court has recognized few instances in
which denying immediate appeal of an interlocutory decision made
later vindication of an individual's claims impossible, courts ought to
recognize such an instance in the case of a litigant whose motion to
appoint counsel is denied. Since such a litigant may well "already
have lost the rights he seeks to preserve" 147 by the time the court enters a final judgment from which appeal may be taken, orders denying
motions to appoint counsel are effectively unreviewable. These orders
are also conclusive and collateral to the merits of the original action.
Thus, under the collateral order doctrine, as developed in a long line
of cases beginning with Cohen and ending for the moment with Koller,
an order denying appointment of counsel qualifies for immediate review. Immediate review is necessary if the collateral order doctrine is
to further justice where technical insistence on finality does not.

147. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1324 (9th Cir. 1981) (Wallace, J.,
dissenting).

